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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DALE KURT ROTHE, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
vs. 
JODY ROTHE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
Category 14b 
Appeals No.: 880018-CA 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
COMES NOW Appellant in the above-entitled matter and 
replies to Respondent's Brief pursuant to Rule 24 (c) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NEW MATTERS SET FORTH 
IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
1. Plaintiff-respondent Jody Rothe asserts that 
defendant-appellant Dale Rothe lacks standing to bring this 
appeal because, pursuant to the divorce decree, he signed over 
a quit-claim deed to the residence in question, thereby 
"eliminating" his interest therein. (Respondent's Brief, 
page 3). 
2. Plaintiff asserts that parol evidence regarding the 
intent of the parties when the decree of divorce was signed 
should not be allowed because of the "clear and unambiguous 
language" of the decree. (Respondent's Brief, Page 4). 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT DALE ROTHE HAS A PRESENT, SUBSTANTIAL 
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT CAUSE OF ACTION,, 
Plaintiff believes defendant has no standing because 
he signed over a quit-claim deed to the home in question to 
plaintiff. Of course, defendant only did that after the 
divorce decree was signed creating the obligation of plaintiff 
to make the mortgage payments and after plaintiff had indeed 
made 10 payments towards that mortgage through a deduction 
made by defendant in alimony owed to her. (R. 226). To now 
allege, several years later, when legal imperfections in the 
loan documents present a question regarding the validity of 
the mortgage, that defendant's actions in signing the deed 
eliminates his interest concerning the intent of the divorce 
decree is ludicrous for several reasons. 
First, just because defendant arguably can no longer 
receive the benefits of the premises, does not mean he is 
immune from the obligation associated with it. There is no 
dispute that he signed the document obligating himself to the 
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payments on the house. Should it be determined that plaintiff 
not be responsible for those payments, the obligation remains 
for the defendant. Thei: e i s obvi ous 11 y a l'persona 1 stake in 
the outcome of the controversy as to warrant , Invocation 
of t.he Court's jurisdiction." 59 Am. J ur 2d, Parties Sec. 
31. 
Second, plaintiff maintains that, even though defendant 
is obli gated for the pay ments, h I s parents ;«rI ] 1 never make him 
pay, and therefore eliminates his interest. Obviously, an 
interest sufficient to invoke standing by the court must be 
based on legal rights and obligations and not hearsay beliefs 
on whether or not such legal rights will be enforced. The 
fact ot t ho m.itfpr is that, in .i separate cause of action 
currently in the Fourth District Court, defendant has been 
sued on the document b his parents, In their Counterclaim 
and Third-Party Compla. , F ::>i i K ai n :i Am} I t Rothe L: I. : jr 
judgment against defendant for back payments not made, 
foreclosure of the premises for default, and for 
indemnification should they be held liable for filing a notice 
of interest against the home in question, Again, defendant 
clearly h \'- in nterest :i n f'he out r:op"p of Hi i s ippeal. 
Finally, it must be remembered h<>w this appeal occurred. 
This issue is only one of many concerning the proper 
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interpretation and enforcement of a divorce decree between 
the parties• Certainly defendant has an interest in that 
decree. Indeed, the only reason defendant signed over the 
quit-claim deed to plaintiff was pursuant to that decree. 
Should the decree need to be modified, it might well need to 
have the deed rescinded in order to work justice and equity 
between the parties and the dissolution of their marriage. 
The above analysis clearly fulfills the test for 
standing, as quoted in plaintiff's brief, from the case of 
Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands and Forestry, 716 P.2d 
796 (Utah 1986). In Terracor the court went into detail to 
explain the purpose of standing in Utah: 
Unlike federal law where standing doctrine is related to 
the"case or controversy" language of Article III of the 
United States Constitution, our standing law arises from 
the general precepts of the doctrine of separation of 
powers found in Article V of the Utah Constitution. 
Terracor at 798. There is obviously no worry of encroaching 
upon other branches of government with the issues involved in 
this appeal. The court then continues to set out three 
general standards to determine whether or not a litigant has 
standing. If the first criterion is met, the other two do not 
apply. That first criterion is that there is "some distinct 
and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute." Terracor at 799. As explained 
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above, defendant is clearly liable for the payment of the 
mortgage and is currently being sued for those payments. This 
appeal win, 1 I, determine whether or not: iliose payments are 
rightfully due from plaintiff. 11 is a direct, real, 
financial stake in the outcome of this proceeding. 
The second criterion, i f the fI i :st is not found t o t e 
adequate, is that standing will be allowed if no one has 
greater :i i iterest i n the 01 itcome of the case and the issues are 
unlikely to be raised at all unless defendant raises them. Id. 
Clearly defendant's parents need not bring this cause of 
action for they already have defendant 1 i abl e on the mortgage. 
The only other way this issue could come up on appeal would 
be defendant's third-party indemnification claim 
against plaintiff in the other lawsuit. The issue would be 
identical. The harm to defendant identical. It is only 
natural l/hcil" defendant t:v( 1 he proper party to bring the issue 
on appeal. 
Pursuant to Utah case law the facts of this case 
clearly show that defendant has standing in this appeal. 
Defendant respectfully requests this court to find the 
necessary standing and to determine the issues on their merits 
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according to the briefs submitted. 
DATED this ^ / day of December, 1988, 
fi^f7^ /2 ^ 6 ^ 
Wayne/6-/ Watson,P.C. 
Atto^n^y for Defendant-Appellant 
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